1a-116a (original appeal), 144a-162a (appeal after remand for resentencing on firearms convictions).ġ. Petitioners Castillo, Branch, Whitecliff, and Craddock were fined $2000 each, petitioner Avraam was fined $10,000, and petitioners together were ordered to pay $1.1 million in restitution. Petitioner Craddock was sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years for the firearms offense and ten years for possession of a destructive device, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Petitioners Castillo, Branch, Avraam, and Whitecliff were sentenced to consecutive terms of ten years' imprisonment for manslaughter and 30 years' imprisonment for the firearms offense, to be followed by five years of supervised release. Petitioner Craddock was convicted of possessing an unregistered destructive device, in violation of 26 U.S.C. V 1993).1 Petitioners Castillo, Branch, Avraam, and Whitecliff were also convicted of voluntary manslaughter of federal officers, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
TYPE 99 ARISAKA SERIAL NUMBER 6406 TRIAL
5845(b), and the current version of Section 924(c) are reprinted at App., infra, 1a-6a.Īfter a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, each petitioner was convicted of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. The jurisdiction of this Court rests on 28 U.S.C. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on October 15, 1999, and granted on January 14, 2000. Petitions for rehearing were denied on J(Pet. The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on June 22, 1999. 165a-169a) and in connection with the original sentencing (Pet. The opinions of the district court on remand (Pet.
1a-116a), affirming petitioners' convictions and remanding for resentencing on one count, is reported at 91 F.3d 699.
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. 924(c)(1) in effect at the time of petitioners' offenses. Whether the type of firearm used or carried by an offender during and in relation to a predicate offense was a sentencing factor, rather than an element of the offense, under the version of 18 U.S.C. In the Supreme Court of the United States